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NOTES AND COMMENTS
to give some support to the surviving spouse even if the deceased lost
the property unwillingly. But the statute has no relevancy to invol-
untarily transferred property if the legislative purpose was to give
to the wife an element of control over the husband's property, or,
more important, if it was to prevent the husband from deliberately
depriving his wife of her distributive share by conveying away his
real property before death. Thus in the principal case there is doubt
as to whether inchoate dower should have been recognized at all,
although by the best precedent the wife was so entitled.
If inchoate dower is to be allowed, however, the Bowditch Table
should no longer be used for valuation, inasmuch as there is no pres-
ent basis for its assumption that dower is certain to attach provided
the wife survives the husband. Since 1932, with dower abolished
in all lands of which the owner died seized, there is now no such
certainty; and if the owner had not been forced to convey his prop-
erty by order of the court, there is at least the possibility that he
would have kept it until his death. Granted that the possibility of
the owner's not disposing of his property cannot be figured on an
actuarial basis, yet it must be conceded that the new uncertainty
added by the 1932 statutory change in policy should somewhat lessen
the value of inchoate dower. There is no evidence that the court
considered this in setting the amount of the award in the principal
case. W.N.P.
SALES
SALES-EFFECT OF REPOSSESSION FOR A SPECIAL PURPOSE
BY THE SELLER UPON A SUBSEQUENT MORTGAGE
The plaintiff purchased a new Hudson automobile from a dealer
and agreed to pay for it by trading in his old car and giving a check
to cover the balance. After using the car a day or two the plaintiff
returned it to the dealer to have a new clutch installed. It was nec-
essary for the dealer to send to the factory for the new part. Pend-
ing completion of the repairs the plaintiff temporarily stopped pay-
ment of the check. Several weeks later the dealer mortgaged the
car to the defendant finance company whose agents secured posses-
sion in some manner and placed it in the defendant's garage.1 The
plaintiff brought an action of replevin for the car. The trial court
1 Both the Eastbourne Garage, Inc. and the C. I. T. Corp. were joined as defendants
in this action.
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found that there was an agreement 2 between the plaintiff and the
dealer to treat the check as absolute payment3 and that it was in no
way affected by the temporary stoppage of payment since it was
only a means of protecting the plaintiff's interests and was in no
way a dishonor. Judgment was for the plaintiff in the lower court
and the defendant finance company appealed. 'Held: Affirmed. Ohio
G. C. Sec. 8405 (Section 25 of the Uniform Sales Act) was inap-
plicable because the car was actually delivered to the purchaser and
then returned to the vendor for the purpose of repair.4  Schafstall
v. The Eastbourne Garage, Inc., 65 Ohio App. 481, 3o N. E. (2d)
571 (Court of Appeals, Hamilton County, i94o).
Ohio G. C. Sec. 8405 provides where one purchases goods and
the vendor continues in possession, a subsequent transfer of the
goods by the vendor to any person receiving and paying value for
the same goods in good faith and without notice of the previous sale
will have the same effect as if the vendee had expressly authorized
the vendor to do so.' The rule is based on the theory that a vendee
who allows this to happen is guilty of constructive, if not actual,
fraud and therefore a subsequent transferee in good faith should be
protected.6 However, as the court pointed out, the section applies
only to those situations where the vendor continues in possession.
The court did not discuss the period of time during which a vendee
must have possession which in this case was at best only one or two
days. The common law rule required such a change of possession
The record only shows that the plaintiff asked the dealer "whether he would accept
my check in payment for the car" and the dealer said "yes".
3 Ordinarily a check is considered as only a conditional payment of a debt, but if the
parties so desire they may stipulate otherwise by express agreement. See: Way v. Mooers,
135 Minn. 339, 160 N. W. 1014 (1917); Wheeler v. Kitchen, 67 Okla. 131, 169 Pac. 877
(1917); Strong v. King, 35 Ill. 9, 85 Am. Dec. 336 (1864).
4There was no problem of constructive notice of the sale to the finance company by
reason of the bill of sale, because it was not recorded by the dealer as he had agreed to do.
This section of the General Code follows the common law. See Jewett v. Lincoln,
14 Me. 116, 31 Am. Dec. 36 (1836); Brown v. Pierce, 97 Mass. 46, 93 Am. Dec. 57
(1867); Lanfear v. Sumner, 17 Mass. 110, 9 Am. Dec. 119 (1821); The Hallet & Davis
Piano Co. v. The Starr Piano Co., 85 Ohio St. 196, 97 N. E. 377 (1911). See Shaddon
v. Knott, 2 Swan (Tenn.) 358, 58 Am. Dec. 63 (1852) to the effect that continuance in
possession is only prima facie evidence of fraud. Also Meade v. Smith, 16 Conn. 346
(1844).
6While the defendant finance company could have argued Section 26 of the Sales Act,
since it also could qualify as a creditor, it did not do so for the obvious reason that the
effect of Section 25 is to make retention of possession by the seller conclusive evidence of
fraud, whereas under Section 2b if the vendor continues in possession of the goods a
creditor of the vendor may treat the sale as void only if such retention of possession
is fraudulent in fact or under any rule of law.
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as would "give notice to the world" of the change in ownership.7
This same result has been reached under the Sales Act." It is not
quite clear whether the court felt that formal compliance alone was
Enough to satisfy the requirement of delivery or that it was also
necessary for the vendee to retain possession in good faith for a
period reasonable under the circumstances. The latter construction
is to be preferred since it closes the door to fraudulent practices.
While it is true in general "prior in time is prior in right" and a
statutory modification of that principle should probably be strictly
construed, such construction should not be so strict as to protect the
prior vendee where the change in possession has been purely nomi-
nal. Some courts have required a longer period of possession by
the vendee. These decisions are in accord with the general rule that
a mere formal delivery followed by a return to the vendor is not
sufficient to remove the presumption of fraud. These cases require
a more substantial period of possession by the vendee. These cases
are not in conflict and can be reconciled.10 The general proposition
is that there must be more than a formal change in possession. It
must be real and substantial. The variance in the cases is not be-
cause different rules of law were applied, but because of different
,stevens v. Irwin, 15 Cal. 503, 76 Am. Dec. 500 (1860); White v. O'Brien, 61 Conn.
34, 23 At!. 751 (1891); Brown v. Riley, 22 IIL. 46 (1859); Deere & Co. v. Needles, 65
Iox:a 101, 21 N. V. 203 (1884); Reynolds v. Beck, 108 Mo. App. 188, 83 S. V. 292
(1904); Brady v. Haines, 18 Pa. 113 (1851).
' In the case of Bauer v. The Commercial Credit Corp., 163 Wash. 210, 300 Pac. 1049
(1931) where section 25 of the Sales Act was argued, the court said that possession by
the vendee for only a few weeks was sufficient to give notice to the world even though
the car was returned for the purpose of resale. The same result was reached under sec-
tion 26 of the Sales Act in Foss v. Towne, 98 Vt. 321, 127 AtI. 294 (1925).
Section 74 of the Sales Act provides that the Act shall be interpreted so as to make
uniform the laws of those states adopting it. See: Huchinson v. Renner, 28 Ohio App.
22, 162 N. E. 451 (1928) and Stewart v. Hansen, 62 Utah 281, 218 Pac. 959 (1923).
ORichardson v. Woodring, 74 Iowa 149, 37 N. W. 122 (1887) a period of several
months possession by the vendee was not sufficient; Weeks v. Wead, 2 Aik. (Vt.) 64
(1826) a ten day period was insufficient; Van Pelt v. Littler, 10 Cal. 394 (1858) period
of several days not sufficient; Norton v. Doolittle, 32 Conn. 405 (1865) a vendee in pos-
session only two days before return to the vendor couldn't recover.
" In Richardson v. l!'oodri;zg, note 9 supra, a stock of goods in a furniture store was
sold to a mine operator who knew at the time that the goods were subject to a chattel
mortgage. The vendee took possession of the store and the goods therein, but after
several months possession, gave the possession and the control back to the vendor. In
Weeks v. Wead, note 9 s.Pra, a horse was sold by a judgment debtor to W who retained
possession for a period of eight or ten days, during which time the vendor received part
of the benefits. The horse was then returned to the vendor who used it as his own. In
Vat; Pelt v. Littler, note 9 supra, F sold his stock of goods and leased his store to V who
took possession and ran the business for a few days. V then gave control and possession
back to the vendor. In Norton v. Doolittle, note 9 supra, A sold cattle to B who had
po:se-ion for two days and then leased them back to A who used them as he had previous
to the sale.
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fact situations. Events leading up to the transaction and subsequent
thereto are all important in deciding cases of this type. Under the
circumstances presented in the principal case it does not seem un-
reasonable. to say that a day or two is sufficient period of possession
in the vendee so as to give "notice to the world."
Had the facts of this case arisen a few months later the result
would have been determined by the Certificate of Title law which
did not become effective until January I, 1939.11 However, since
that law is applicable only to motor vehicles the question is still open
where the sale of other chattels is involved. While the case is weak
and indecisive on some points, it would seem that the interpretation
given in the principal case of Section 25 of the Sales Act is correct.
G. O. A.
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
STATUTORY TORT LIABILITY UNDER MOTOR VEHICLE
LAWS-EQUIVOCAL LANGUAGE IN RELATION TO
PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
Plaintiff, as administrator, brought an action against a board
of county commissioners for the death of his decedent. Death re-
sulted from the negligent operation of a motor truck by an employee
of the defendant while driving the truck to its final destination from
the place of technical ,delivery. Jury trial resulted in a verdict for
plaintiff, but the court entered judgment non obstante verdicto. Qn
appeal held, reversed, liability being predicated upon the Michigan
Motor Vehicle Statute I which makes the owners of "motor vehicles"
liable for injuries occasioned by their negligent operation. Miller
v. County Bd. of Road Comm'rs, 297 Mich. 487, 298 N. W. io5
(i94i).
Defendant's immunity was conceded under the common-law rule
of non-liability in the exercise of governmental functions. The issue
in the principal case was, therefore, solely as to whether the Michigan
legislature intended in the adoption of its motor vehicle legislation
to subject municipal and public quasi-corporations to responsibility
for tortious conduct in the operation of their vehicles. As the law
U OHio G. C. Sec. 6290.2 et seq.
1 MiCH. STAT. ANN. (Henderson, 1937) §9. 1431 (definition of "motor vehicle"),
9. 1446 (statutory liability for negligent operation).
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